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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _____________________________ 
 
 
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge: 
 Inez Baker, her two children, Corey and Tiffany Baker, 
and her foster daughter, Jacquine Anderson, appeal from a summary 
judgment against them in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim 
against Monroe Township, Robert Armstrong, a Monroe Township 
police officer, and numerous John Doe defendants who were police 
officers or federal Drug Enforcement Agency agents.  The Baker 
family alleges illegal search and seizure of their persons and 
property and use of excessive force, which occurred as the family 
group approached the home of Mrs. Baker's son, Clementh Griffin, 
just as police were commencing a drug raid there.  The district 
court entered judgment for Monroe Township and for Armstrong, 
  
holding that the Bakers made no showing that either of these 
defendants was legally responsible for any violation of the 
Bakers' rights that may have occurred.  The district court also 
refused to allow the Bakers to amend their complaint to correct 
the names of the John Doe defendants, and refused to reconsider 
the summary judgment ruling based on an affidavit that was filed 
out of time under the local rules.  We reverse and remand on the 
issue of whether the Bakers showed evidence that could render 
Armstrong personally liable for the alleged civil rights 
violations and also remand for consideration of whether Tiffany 
Baker should be permitted to amend to correct fictitious names. 
 Around 8:30 on the evening of Friday, June 1, 1990, 
Mrs. Baker, Corey, Tiffany, and Jacquine were approaching the 
home of Clementh Griffin, Mrs. Baker's son, and his girlfriend, 
Cheryl Woods, who had invited them to dinner.  It was still light 
outside, though dusk.  At the same time, police from three 
jurisdictions were launching a drug raid on the same apartment, 
authorized by a "no-knock" warrant.1  As the Bakers walked up to 
                     
     
1The warrant consisted of a form authorizing search of:  
"the (x) premises (x) person (x) vehicle described below" 
(emphasis added).  Though x's were filled in each of the three 
blanks, the space for the promised description contained only an 
identification of the premises to be searched and mentioned 
nothing about any persons. Although the dissent, infra at 8-9, 
considers this a warrant for search of specified persons, the 
only common-sense interpretation of the document is that no one 
ever bothered to complete it to include specified persons as well 
as premises.  This flawed document does not demonstrate that the 
magistrate determined search of any particular person to be 
justified.   
 
 The "description below" referred only to an apartment in a 
three story wood frame residence.  There is no description, 
  
the door, they were suddenly surprised by officers running past 
them with guns in their hands, shouting, "Get down."  Some of the 
officers (including Armstrong) ran directly into the house, but 
others forced the Bakers down to the ground.  The Bakers 
testified that the officers pointed guns at them, handcuffed them 
and left some of them handcuffed for as much as twenty-five 
minutes, searched Corey Baker, and emptied Mrs. Baker's 
pocketbook onto the ground outside the apartment.  After the 
Bakers identified themselves as relatives of Clementh Griffin, 
the police released them.   
                                                                  
general or specific, of any person as in the warrant we 
considered in United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 389 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971).  Nor did the language 
in the description refer to a place and any or all "persons found 
therein" as did the warrants before the courts in State v. Sims, 
382 A.2d 638, 642 (N.J. 1978), and State v. DeSimone, 288 A.2d 
849, 850 (N.J. 1972).  The Fourth Amendment requires that the 
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the 
persons to be seized.  The face of the warrant demonstrates its 
failure to meet the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
dissent engages in a lengthy interpretation of the warrant to 
find authorization for a search of persons found on the premises.  
The dissent then proceeds to analyze Sims and DeSimone, cases 
which specifically referred to persons on the premises, to 
include a question of probable cause.  This elaborate 
interpretation and analysis and the length to which the dissent 
goes in developing it simply point up the inadequacy of the 
warrant to describe any person generally or specifically.  Having 
said as much, we need not speculate further as to whether the 
dissent's interpretation would cover not only persons found on 
the premises, but those outside the premises and on the sidewalk 
and steps leading into it.  It is also evident that the dissent 
makes its interpretation and bases its analysis on the facts 
taken in the light most favorable to the party moving for summary 
judgment rather than the non-movant, contrary to the constraints 
we have referred to that guide us in reviewing an order granting 
summary judgment.  Infra at 7. 
  
 The Bakers brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging, inter alia, violations of their Fourth Amendment rights 
by illegal seizure and use of excessive force.  They specified 
only Robert Armstrong and Monroe Township as defendants, using 
fictitious names for sixteen other defendants whom they 
identified as assisting in the raid. 
 Armstrong and Monroe Township moved for summary 
judgment.  The district court held that, assuming the Bakers' 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the Bakers made no showing 
that Armstrong either committed the violations personally, 
directed someone else to commit them, or had knowledge of the 
violations and acquiesced in them.  Instead, the court stated, 
the evidence indicated that Armstrong was inside the apartment 
while the alleged violations took place outside the apartment.  
Moreover, there was no evidence that Armstrong should have 
trained the other officers to behave differently, for though he 
was in charge of this particular raid, the other men were 
employees of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency and the 
Gloucester County Prosecutor's office, whom Armstrong could 
expect to be adequately trained.  Since Armstrong was the only 
Monroe Township official involved in the raid, the district court 
found no causal link between anything the Township did or did not 
do and the harm alleged.   
 The Bakers then sought leave to amend their complaint 
to correct the fictitious names of several of the officers they 
allege participated directly in the rough treatment.  The Bakers 
brought this suit on June 1, 1992, the last day before expiration 
  
of the two-year statute of limitations.  Despite having received 
in March 1993 the names of the officers involved in the raid, the 
plaintiffs did not move to amend their complaint to correct the 
fictitious names until after the district court had entered 
summary judgment against them on November 5, 1993.  At that 
point, the district court ruled that the Bakers had not made the 
requisite showing of diligence under New Jersey law, see Farrell 
v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 299 A.2d 394 (N.J. 1973), and 
that state law would not permit the relation-back of the Bakers' 
amended complaint.  Their claims would be time-barred, and so the 
district court denied the Bakers' motion to amend their 
complaint. 
 The Bakers moved for reconsideration of the summary 
judgment against them, arguing that they asserted state law 
claims that should not have been dismissed and that the court 
erred in its ruling on the section 1983 claims.  About three 
weeks after their motion for reconsideration, they produced for 
the first time the affidavit of Clementh Griffin, containing 
evidence which was relevant to the elements the district court 
earlier held were not established.  The court ruled that the 
Bakers filed their motion for reconsideration too late under the 
local rules, General Rules for the District of New Jersey 12I, 
and therefore denied the motion, except that it remanded the 
state law claims to the state courts.   
 On appeal, the Bakers argue that the district court 
erred in entering summary judgment against them and in denying 
  
their motions for reconsideration and to amend their complaint to 
correct the fictitious names. 
 
 I. 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
holding that the Bakers were not diligent in seeking to correct 
the fictitious names in their complaint.  However, the Bakers 
argue that Tiffany and Corey Baker were minors at the time of the 
events in question and that the statute of limitations has not 
expired as to them.2  Though the Bakers' brief does not supply us 
with Corey Baker's birth date, the defendants inform us that 
Corey Baker reached majority in January 1991, some six months 
after the events in question, and that the statute of limitations 
has expired as to him.  Once the defendants showed the applicable 
limitation period had elapsed, Corey Baker had the burden to 
prove the statute was tolled.  Burlington County Country Club v. 
Midlantic Nat'l Bank South, 538 A.2d 441, 443 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1987).  This he has failed to do.  On the other hand, the 
defendants concede that the statute "may" not have expired for 
Tiffany Baker, who was born on December 1, 1974.  We therefore 
remand for the district court to determine whether Tiffany Baker 
should be granted leave under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend her 
complaint.  
 
                     
     
2The evidence also indicates Jacquine was a minor at the 
time of the events, but the plaintiffs do not mention this. 
  
 II. 
 We will not disturb the district court's refusal to 
consider the Clementh Griffin affidavit.  The Bakers argue that 
the district court miscalculated the number of business days 
between entry of its judgment and the motion to reconsider.  Even 
if this is true, the motion to reconsider only reiterated 
arguments already before the court (except for the motion to 
remand state law claims, which the court granted).  The only 
filing that would actually help the Bakers was the Griffin 
affidavit, which was in itself essentially a new motion to 
reconsider and which was filed well out of time.  The district 
court's ruling was warranted under the local rules.  
 
 III. 
 The merits of this case involve Fourth Amendment 
questions of what police may lawfully do with persons who happen 
to find themselves in the middle of a drug raid, and questions of 
responsibility under section 1983 of supervisors and 
municipalities for others' conduct. 
 We review the district court's entry of summary 
judgment de  novo, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant and giving the nonmovant the benefit 
of all reasonable inferences.  Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 
446 (3d Cir. 1994).  When the movant has produced evidence in 
support of his motion, the nonmovants cannot rest on their 
pleadings, but must come forward with enough evidence to create a 
material issue of fact.  See id.  
  
 In order to render Armstrong personally liable under 
section 1983, the Bakers must show that he participated in 
violating their rights, or that he directed others to violate 
them, or that he, as the person in charge of the raid, had 
knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.3  
See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 
1990); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 A municipality can only be liable under section 1983 
when the municipality itself causes the violation.  City of 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).  The Bakers must show 
that a policymaker for the Township authorized policies that led 
to the violations or permitted practices that were so permanent 
and well settled as to establish acquiescence.  Simmons v. City 
of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1064 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480. 
 
 We reject the Bakers' argument that Monroe  Township is 
liable for the actions of police from other jurisdictions solely 
by virtue of a failure to train those police.  It is unreasonable 
to expect Monroe Township to retrain officers from the County 
prosecutor's office and the D.E.A., and the Bakers have produced 
                     
     
3It is also possible to establish section 1983 supervisory 
liability by showing a supervisor tolerated past or ongoing 
misbehavior, see e.g. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 
F.2d 720, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 
(1990); since the facts of this case do not implicate such a 
theory, we need not belabor it. 
  
no evidence showing that Monroe Township had reason to think such 
a thing necessary. 
 The actions the Bakers complain of are best analyzed in 
four aspects ranging from the least objectionable to the most.   
 
 A. 
 First, we consider Armstrong's order to the Bakers to 
"Get down" as Armstrong ran into the Griffin-Woods apartment.  
Armstrong freely admits that he shouted this order when he saw 
the Bakers and that the other officers "followed suit," all 
shouting the same command.  Armstrong also specifically alluded 
to this as the customary way of doing things:  "Just from working 
over the years, I know that the people I'm passing are going to 
be secured, again, for their safety as well as our safety."  
However, as Armstrong described the practice, it does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.  Armstrong testified that it was necessary 
to burst into the house without warning in order to prevent 
people in the house from destroying evidence.  He had a "no-
knock" warrant for this very reason.  The Bakers were at the 
doorstep as he ran in.  He feared the raid could result in 
violence, and considered it necessary to get the Bakers down on 
the ground, partly to protect them from stray gunshots.  
Armstrong also said that at the instant he encountered the 
Bakers, he did not know whether the Bakers were coming to or 
going from the house, nor did he know whether they were the very 
people whose house he had a warrant to search.  There is no doubt 
but that the Bakers had some relationship to the apartment since 
  
Corey was on the steps and the others were right behind.  
Moreover, Armstrong testified that the presence of citizens 
standing in the middle of the raid could prevent the police 
officers from defending themselves, since they would not be able 
to return fire in the midst of a crowd.   
 Under these circumstances, it was entirely reasonable 
to order the Bakers to "get down," until the situation was under 
control.  Armstrong's order is justified under two lines of 
Supreme Court cases.  Under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 
(1981), during execution of a search warrant, police can detain 
the occupant of the house they have a warrant to search.  This is 
reasonable to protect the police, to prevent flight, and 
generally to avoid dangerous confusion:  "The risk of harm to 
both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers 
routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation."  Id. 
at 702-03.  The dangerousness of chaos is quite pronounced in a 
drug raid, where the occupants are likely to be armed, where the 
police are certainly armed, and the nature of the suspected drug 
operation would involve a great deal of coming and going by drug 
customers.  In his application for the warrant, Armstrong swore 
that a concerned citizen advised that "numerous young adults and 
children" were going to the apartment and he had confirmed this 
personally by surveillance.  Armstrong said he did not know 
whether or not the Bakers were the occupants of the house.  
Although Summers itself only pertains to a resident of the house 
under warrant, it follows that the police may stop people coming 
to or going from the house if police need to ascertain whether 
  
they live there.  See United States v. Moreno, 891 F.2d 247, 249 
(9th Cir. 1989) (citing both Summers and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968)).  
 The order to "get down" is also permissible under the 
line of cases following Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which 
permit an investigatory stop, not rising to the level of arrest, 
in situations presenting less than probable cause.  Under the 
Terry cases, the reasonableness of the intrusion is the 
touchstone, balancing the need of law enforcement officials 
against the burden on the affected citizens and considering the 
relation of the policeman's actions to his reason for stopping 
the suspect.  See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682-83 
(1985); see generally United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 
1197-98 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234 (1991); United 
States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 111 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 
U.S. 916 (1987).  Here, the need to ascertain the Bakers' 
identity, the need to protect them from stray gunfire, and the 
need to clear the area of approach for the police to be able to 
operate efficiently all made it reasonable to get the Bakers down 
on the ground for a few crucial minutes.  Armstrong's initial 
order to "get down" and the other officers' actions in pushing 
the Bakers down to the ground did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment violation, and therefore did not render Armstrong 
himself or Monroe Township liable.  
 
 B. 
  
 Second, we consider the closer question of whether the 
police detained the Bakers for an unconstitutionally long time.  
As with the order to "get down," Armstrong admits that he was 
aware the Bakers were being detained until they could be 
identified and that this was consistent with his regular 
practices.  Under Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86, there is no per se 
rule about the length of time a suspect may be detained before 
the detention becomes a full-scale arrest.  Instead, the court 
must examine the reasonableness of the detention, particularly 
whether the police were diligent in accomplishing the purpose of 
the stop as rapidly as possible.  Here, the Bakers state they 
were held a total of about twenty-five minutes, about ten minutes 
outside and as long as fifteen minutes inside.  Significantly, 
Armstrong did not "holler" out the door for the others to bring 
the Bakers inside until after the house had been "secured," 
meaning that police had located and gained control over the 
people in the house.  Armstrong testified that this took only a 
"minute or two," but there is obviously a margin for error here; 
it would be absurd to expect police in peril for their lives to 
time their motions with a stop-watch.  Given the uncertainty over 
what would happen until the house was secured, it is not 
surprising that the police could not begin sorting out who was 
who for the first ten minutes.  After they were brought in the 
apartment, Tiffany Baker, Inez Baker and Armstrong all estimated 
that fifteen minutes elapsed before the Bakers left.  At least 
part of that time was taken up with Armstrong delivering an 
apology and explanation to Mrs. Baker for the detention.  
  
(Armstrong said:  "It was probably more time explaining what went 
on in that fifteen minutes of detaining the Baker family than 
anything else.")  Under Sharpe when "police are acting in a 
swiftly developing situation . . . court[s] should not indulge in 
unrealistic second-guessing."  470 U.S. at 686.  We cannot say 
that a detention of fifteen minutes time to identify and release 
a fairly large group of people during a drug raid is 
unreasonable.  Therefore, Armstrong's admission that the Bakers 
were detained fifteen minutes inside and some amount of time 
outside, taken alone, does not render him or Monroe Township 
liable.  
 
 C. 
 Third, we consider the use of guns and handcuffs.  The 
district court concluded that the Bakers' depositions do not 
indicate Armstrong personally used guns or handcuffs, nor that he 
directed anyone else to do so.  This conclusion is borne out by 
the record.  Armstrong was the senior officer in charge of 
executing the warrant.  Corey Baker testified that as he stood on 
the doorstep, Armstrong ran past him, into the house.  Then, 
while the Baker family was still outside, others pointed guns at 
them, pushed them down to the ground and handcuffed them.  Other 
police brought Clementh Griffin and Cheryl Woods outside, but 
Tiffany Baker could not say whether Armstrong came outside.  
After the Bakers had been held outside for a few minutes, police 
brought them into the house.  They left all the family but Corey 
in the kitchen.  Police took Corey into the bedroom and searched 
  
him, but Corey specifically said Armstrong was not involved in 
the search.  Mrs. Baker said that she saw Armstrong for the first 
time while inside the apartment and that he came into the kitchen 
and told the other officers to unhandcuff her and remove the gun 
that was pointed at her.  Tiffany Baker said she never saw 
Armstrong until they were outside, after they had been released 
and were leaving.  No testimony indicates Armstrong participated 
personally in the hand-cuffing or gun-point detention. 
 There is no per se rule that pointing guns at people, 
or handcuffing them, constitutes an arrest.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (use 
of handcuffs and gun during investigatory stop); United States v. 
Trullo, 809 F.2d at 113 (use of gun during investigatory stop); 
United States v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(same); United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 
1986) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1097 (1987); see generally 
United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1198.  But use of guns and 
handcuffs must be justified by the circumstances, as in the cases 
listed.  Moreover, we must look at the intrusiveness of all 
aspects of the incident in the aggregate.  In this case, adding 
up the use of guns and handcuffs and, indeed, the length of the 
detention, shows a very substantial invasion of the Bakers' 
personal security.  See United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821 
(9th Cir. 1990) (drawing weapon on cooperative suspect, ordering 
him to lie prone, and handcuffing amount to arrest).  Armstrong 
himself said that the use of handcuffs would have been 
inappropriate until there was an arrest, and that the other 
  
officers with him work the same way.  Here, accepting the Bakers' 
testimony, the police used all of those intrusive methods without 
any reason to feel threatened by the Bakers, or to fear the 
Bakers would escape.  It was dusk but still daylight as Mrs. 
Baker, Corey and Jacquine, both age 17, and Tiffany, age 15, 
approached the apartment.  Considering the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Bakers, the appearances were those of a 
family paying a social visit, and while it may have been a visit 
to a wayward son, there is simply no evidence of anything that 
should have caused the officers to use the kind of force they are 
alleged to have used.  If Armstrong acquiesced in the other 
officers' use of guns and handcuffs and if those actions were 
such as the Bakers describe, the testimony, while conflicting, 
would support a finding that Armstrong violated the Bakers' 
Fourth Amendment rights.   
 
 Although Armstrong did not personally use excessive 
force or order its use, we conclude that there is sufficient 
evidence to permit an inference that Armstrong knew of and 
acquiesced in the treatment the Bakers were receiving at the 
hands of the other officers acting under his supervision.  The 
Bakers said they were handcuffed while outside.  Armstrong said 
he "hollered" out the door of the apartment "to bring those 
people in."  Tiffany Baker testified that they were brought into 
the kitchen and her testimony is sufficient to support a finding 
that the Baker women sat in the kitchen for about ten minutes in 
handcuffs.  Mrs. Baker said a gun was pointed at her head.  Corey 
  
Baker was taken to a bedroom in handcuffs and was searched.  He 
testified that he remained handcuffed after he had returned to 
the kitchen and for some five minutes more until he was told it 
was all right to leave.  Tiffany Baker also testified that Corey 
had his handcuffs on until the Bakers were released and told to 
go outside.  It was a small apartment.4  Armstrong stated that 
there was an open doorway from the room in which he was speaking 
to Clementh to the kitchen or dining room where the Bakers were.  
These few facts, taken together, are sufficient to allow a 
factfinder to infer that Armstrong was aware of how the Bakers 
were being treated, but permitted that treatment to continue for 
some amount of time before he stopped it. 
 This evidence satisfies at the summary judgment stage 
the standard our cases require for supervisory liability, that is 
"actual knowledge and acquiescence."  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d at 1207; Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1478.5  We believe that actual 
knowledge can be inferred from circumstances other than actual 
                     
     
4Armstrong stated that the apartment had only three rooms 
and a bath.  Corey Baker's testimony indicates that there was a 
living room, kitchen, and more than one bedroom.   
     
5We note that other circuits have developed broader 
standards for supervisory liability under section 1983.  For 
example, the Eighth Circuit has held that "actual knowledge is 
not an absolute prerequisite" and that "reckless disregard on the 
part of a supervisor will suffice."  Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 
954, 961 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 
134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 698 (1994).  
See Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st 
Cir. 1994); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 
1986).   
  
sight.6  In this case we think the inference of knowledge could 
arise from Armstrong's "hollering" instructions outside to others 
who were holding the Bakers in handcuffs and at gunpoint; and his 
presence in a small apartment where the Baker women were being 
held in one room and Corey Baker was undergoing a protracted 
search in another.  In sum, this evidence is sufficient to 
withstand defendants' request for summary judgment. 
   The Bakers have not shown that Armstrong was a 
policymaker for Monroe Township, and they have not shown any 
evidence of Monroe Township practices regarding handcuffing 
people found at the site of a search or pointing guns at them.  
Their accounts of what happened in this particular case do not 
establish a custom or usage.  City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 1206.  
To the extent the record reveals any policy or custom of Monroe 
Township regarding handcuffs or pointing guns, it exonerates the 
Township, for Officer Armstrong stated that it would not have 
been appropriate to handcuff the Bakers, and denied knowing that 
anyone had handcuffed the Bakers or pointed guns at them.  
Moreover, he expressed the belief that his approach would have 
been widely shared by other police.  The Bakers have failed to 
show that Monroe Township caused their injuries. 
 
 D. 
                     
     
6Although bound by Third Circuit precedent, we believe that 
the dissent takes too narrow a view of actual knowledge, 
apparently contending that Armstrong had to actually see the 
activities to have actual knowledge of them.   
  
 Finally, we reach the search of Corey Baker and of Mrs. 
Baker's purse.  Corey Baker said he was taken into a back room 
and searched.  He said:  "They searched me, took my wallet out of 
the back pocket and went all through it, and they made me take 
off my shoes, checked down inside, checked my socks and stuff."  
He said he was forced to take his shirt off and that police went 
through his pants pockets.  Mrs. Baker said her "pocketbook was 
snatched and emptied out on the ground" while she was still 
outside.   
 As we have said, the actions to control the Bakers 
while the search warrant was executed were justified under 
Michigan v. Summers and Terry.  A search of Corey's and Mrs. 
Baker's persons is not supported by either line of cases.  The 
Supreme Court has recently reiterated that when a protective 
search goes beyond a search for weapons and becomes a search for 
evidence, it is no longer valid under Terry.  Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993).  The alleged actions in 
this case were full-scale searches for evidence, having nothing 
to do with a limited Terry-frisk, and having no probable cause 
justification.  These allegations constitute Fourth Amendment 
violations.   
 As with the use of excessive force, the key question 
about the searches is whether Armstrong and Monroe Township were 
responsible.  Armstrong denies that the Bakers were subjected to 
even a limited Terry-frisk. 
 Q: Were Mrs. Baker or her children subject 
to any type of body search while they're 
in the house? 
  
 
 A: No, sir. 
 
 Q: Would it have been routine that they 
would have been subject to any type of 
pat-down search? 
 
 . . . . 
 
 A: No, sir. 
 
 Q: Would it have been routine for the 
officers securing them to have searched 
their pocketbooks?  
 
 A: No, sir. 
 
 
 
 However, as with the handcuffing and use of guns, we 
conclude that there is a conflict in testimony as to Armstrong's 
knowledge about the search of Corey Baker.  Corey testified that 
police took him through the kitchen and the living room to the 
first bedroom, where they searched him for five to ten minutes.  
Police went through his wallet, made him take off his shoes and 
shirt, and checked his socks.  Armstrong's mere presence in this 
small apartment where Corey Baker was undergoing this protracted 
search was sufficient to permit an inference that he was aware of 
the evidentiary search.  Therefore, the district court erred in 
entering summary judgment for Armstrong on this claim. 
 On the other hand, the search of Mrs. Baker's 
pocketbook occurred outside, while Armstrong was inside securing 
the apartment.  We do not believe Armstrong can be held 
accountable for this search, for the evidence does not support 
the inference that Armstrong knew what was happening outside the 
  
apartment.  Consequently, Armstrong was entitled to judgment on 
Mrs. Baker's search claim.   
 As with the handcuffing and use of guns, we see no 
evidence that Monroe Township expressly or tacitly authorized 
either of the searches.  Therefore, there can be no liability as 
to the Township. 
 
 
 IV. 
 We reverse and remand for trial on the issue of whether 
Armstrong acquiesced in the alleged use of excessive force (in 
handcuffing the Bakers and pointing guns at them) and in the 
search of Corey Baker, and for the district court to consider 
whether Tiffany Baker should be granted leave to amend her 
complaint under Rule 15.  In all other respects, we affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
  
Baker v. Monroe 
No. 94-5069 
 
Alito, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
 I join parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIB of the opinion of 
the court.  I cannot, however, join parts IIIC and IIID, which 
reverse the award of summary judgment in favor of Monroe Township 
Police Office Robert Armstrong with respect to the plaintiffs' 
claims regarding the search of Corey Baker and the alleged use of 
excessive force during the Bakers' detention.  In my view, a 
careful analysis of the applicable law and the summary judgment 
record reveals that the district court's award of summary 
judgment with respect to these claims should be affirmed.    
 
 1. 
 On June 1, 1990, Armstrong applied for a "no knock" 
warrant to search an apartment in Williamstown, New Jersey, "and 
persons found therein."  App. at 248-51.  In support of this 
application, Armstrong submitted an affidavit stating:  that on 
May 24, 1990, a confidential informant told him that Cheryl Woods 
and her boyfriend, "Clem" (later identified as Inez Baker's son 
Clementh Griffin), were distributing cocaine from this apartment; 
that on May 27 Armstrong sent a confidential informant into the 
apartment to make a controlled purchase of cocaine from Cheryl 
Woods and that the confidential informant did so; that on May 29 
a concerned citizen informed Armstrong that "numerous young 
  
adults and juveniles" had been going into the apartment to 
purchase cocaine; and that on May 31 Armstrong conducted a short 
surveillance of the apartment and observed young people entering 
and leaving the apartment in a manner that, in Armstrong's 
experience, was indicative of drug distribution activity.  Id.  
Armstrong's application was granted, and the court issued a "no-
knock" warrant.  Id. at 147.   
 At about 8:25 p.m. that evening, Armstrong and a team 
of officers under his direction executed the warrant.  Id. at 63, 
95.  Armstrong identified the other officers as Sergeant R. 
Ferris and Lieutenant T. Watson of the Gloucester County 
Prosecutor's Office and Special Agents K. Donnelly and J. 
Vitaletti of the federal Drug Enforcement Administration.  Id. at 
59-60.  Upon arriving at the apartment, the officers quickly left 
their unmarked van and ran toward the door with their guns drawn.  
Id. at 46, 62-64.  At precisely the time when the officers 
arrived, the plaintiffs in this case were on or near the steps of 
the apartment.  Corey Baker, age 17, was on the steps.  Tiffany 
Baker, age 15, was behind him at the bottom of the steps, 
followed by her older sister, Jacquine Anderson, and their 
mother, Inez Baker (collectively "the Bakers").  Id. at 62, 65, 
119, 129.  Armstrong was the first of the officers to leave the 
van and reach the door of the apartment.  Id. at 62, 65-66.  He 
stated that when he saw the Bakers he could not tell whether they 
were arriving at or leaving the apartment and that he had no idea 
who they were or what their connection might be with the 
apartment.  Id. at 78-79, 85.  He added that he did not know 
  
whether one of them might be Cheryl Woods and that he thought 
that one of them might possibly be armed.  Id. at 75, 79.  As 
Armstrong neared the Bakers, he shouted for them to get down.  
Id. at 62.  He then ran past them and entered the apartment.  Id. 
at 62, 66, 131. 
 Some of what happened next outside the apartment is in 
dispute.  In his deposition, Armstrong stated that two of the 
officers remained outside with the Bakers.  Id. at 77.  In their 
depositions, the Bakers agreed that some officers (not including 
Armstrong) remained outside, but the Bakers estimated that as 
many as 20 officers participated in the raid.  Id. at 119, 123, 
129, 131.  The Bakers stated that some of the officers who 
remained outside (none of whom apparently were deposed) 
handcuffed them, kept them on the ground, and pointed guns at 
them.  Id. at 120-23, 131-32.  In addition, Inez Baker stated 
that one of these officers took her purse, emptied its contents 
on the ground, examined the contents, put them back in the purse, 
and then returned the purse to her.  Id. at 117. 
 Inez Baker estimated that she and the children 
accompanying her remained outside the apartment for about ten 
minutes.  Id. at 366.  There is no evidence that Armstrong was 
present outside the apartment at any time during this period.  
Nor is there any evidence that Armstrong looked out at the area 
where the Bakers were held, that he would have been able to see 
the Bakers from inside the apartment through any door or window, 
or that he had any communications during this period with any of 
the officers who were outside. 
  
 While the Bakers remained outside the apartment, 
Armstrong and the other officers who had entered secured the 
premises and its occupants, Cheryl Woods and Clementh Griffin.  
Id. at 67, 98, 115-16, 122.  According to Armstrong, he then 
shouted out the door "to bring those people in."  Id. at 98.    
The Bakers were brought into the kitchen, which was the first 
room reached through the door.  Id. 71, 84, 112, 124-26.  The 
Bakers said that they were handcuffed when they were led into the 
apartment, and Inez Baker said that one of the officers pointed a 
gun at her during this time.  Id. at 112-14, 123-25, 132.  
However, none of the Bakers said that Armstrong was in the 
kitchen when they were brought in.  Id. at 113.  Corey Baker 
stated that he was taken through the kitchen and living room to 
the first bedroom.  Id. at 132.  There, he said, several officers 
(not including Armstrong) subjected him to a thorough search 
before they returned him to the kitchen.  Id. at 134-35. 
 Armstrong stated that after the Bakers were brought in, 
he went to the kitchen, spoke to Inez Baker, and explained why 
she and the children accompanying her had been ordered to get 
down.  Id. at 68-69.  At this point, he said, he still did not 
know who the Bakers were.  Id.  He stated that he then went to 
another room and was speaking with Clementh Griffin when he heard 
something that Inez Baker was saying.  Id. at 69.  According to 
Armstrong, he asked Sergeant Ferris who Inez Baker was and was 
told that she was Clementh Griffin's mother.  Id.  Armstrong 
stated that he asked Clementh Griffin whether his mother and the 
other Bakers had "anything to do with what may be found in [the] 
  
house," and Griffin answered "no."  Id.  Armstrong said that he 
then went back to the kitchen, explained to Inez Baker what had 
occurred, apologized for the inconvenience, and told her that she 
and her children (other than Clementh Griffin) were free to go.  
Id.  Similarly, Inez Baker said that, after she and the children 
accompanying her had been kept in the kitchen for some time, 
Armstrong came out of another room and said that they should be 
released.  Id. at 114.  She and Armstrong both estimated that 
about 15 minutes had then elapsed from the time when she had been 
brought into the apartment.  Id. at 71, 115. 
 Armstrong said that he never saw Inez Baker in 
handcuffs. (He does not appear to have been asked whether he ever 
saw the other Bakers in handcuffs.)  Armstrong also stated that 
he never saw guns pointed at any of the Bakers.  Id. at 67-68, 
70.   
 
 II. 
 Search of Corey Baker.  Summary judgment was properly 
entered in favor of Armstrong on this claim for two separate 
reasons. 
 A.  First, the terms of the search warrant doom this 
claim.  The warrant (which is reproduced in full as an appendix 
to this opinion) consisted of a printed form with typewritten 
entries (possibly made prior to the submission of the application 
to the judge) and handwritten entries (apparently made by the 
  
judge).7  Paragraph one recited that Armstrong had applied "for a 
search warrant for the (x) premises (x) person (x) vehicle 
described below."  App. at 147.  Paragraph two commanded 
Armstrong and other officers "to search the (x) premises 
described below (x) person(s) described below (x) vehicle 
described below."  Id.  Paragraph 4 stated: 
 The following is a description of the (x) premises, (x) 
person, (x) vehicle to be searched: 
 
 an apartment located in an apartment building at 607 
South Main Street, Williamstown, New Jersey, a three 
(3) story wood frame residence located on the corner of 
South Main Street and Virginia Avenue, having a parking 
lot on the Virginia Avenue side and directly across the 
street from the Williamstown Fire Company. 
 
Id. 
 
 To my mind, by far the best interpretation of these 
provisions of the warrant is that they authorized a search of, 
not only the premises of the apartment, but also any persons 
found on the premises.  That the judge who signed the warrant 
intended to authorize a search of some person or persons seems 
perfectly clear, since the space for "person(s)" in paragraph 2 
and the space for "person" in paragraph 4 were both marked with 
x's.  (Are we to assume that both these x's were mistakes?)  The 
only remaining question, then, is the identity of the person or 
persons who were to be searched, and even if we look only at 
paragraph 4, the answer to this question seems reasonably plain.  
                     
     
7
 In the quotations from the warrant that appear below, the 
printed text is in regular type, and the typewritten text is 
underlined.   
  
Since paragraph 4 is supposed to describe "premises," 
"person[s]," and "vehicle[s]," but expressly refers only to the 
premises of the apartment, the most reasonable interpretation is 
that the warrant authorized a search of the premises and any 
persons or vehicles found on the premises. 
 This interpretation is reinforced by paragraphs one and 
two of the warrant and the warrant application.  As previously 
noted, Armstrong applied for authorization to search the premises 
of the apartment "and persons found therein."  Id. at 251.  
Paragraph one of the warrant, which paraphrased the terms of 
Armstrong's application, stated that he had applied "for a search 
warrant for the (x) premises [and] (x) person(s) . . . described 
below."  Id. at 147.  Thus, paragraph one clearly equated the 
phrase "persons found therein" with the phrase "persons . . . 
described below."  Paragraph two then authorized a search of the 
"(x) premises [and] (x) person(s) . . . described below."  Id.  
Consequently, paragraph two authorized precisely what, according 
to paragraph one, Armstrong sought -- and that was permission to 
search the premises "and persons found therein."  Id. at 25. 
 For these reasons, I believe that the warrant 
authorized a search of any persons found on the premises.  This 
interpretation is consistent with all of the language of the 
warrant, and it gives effect to and harmonizes all of the 
warrant's provisions.  I acknowledge, of course, that it would 
have been better draftsmanship to have referred specifically in 
paragraph 4 to any persons found on the premises, but for 
  
practical purposes the scope of the search that was authorized 
seems to me quite apparent. 
 The majority's alternative interpretation is completely 
unpersuasive.  The majority writes: 
 [T]he only common-sense interpretation of the [warrant] 
is that no one ever bothered to complete it to include 
specified persons as well as premises.  This flawed 
document does not demonstrate that the magistrate 
determined search of any particular person to be 
justified.  
 
Maj. typescript at 3 n.1.  From this paragraph, I take it that 
the majority believes that the municipal judge intended to 
authorize a search of named persons but neglected to ensure that 
the names of these persons were included in the warrant.  
However, this interpretation requires the assumption that the 
judge made a serious and basic error.  Moreover, this 
interpretation is completely inconsistent with the search warrant 
application, which did not request authorization to search any 
named persons but, instead, sought permission to search "any 
persons found" on the premises.  Thus, in order to accept the 
majority's interpretation, one must assume that the judge who 
issued the warrant rejected Armstrong's request for authorization 
to search any persons found on the premises, decided instead to 
authorize a search of named individuals (although such 
authorization had not been sought), and then forgot to ensure 
that these individuals were identified in the warrant.  This 
interpretation, far from being "the only common-sense 
interpretation" of the warrant, seems to me far-fetched. 
  
 After advancing this interpretation of the warrant, the 
majority contends that if the warrant were interpreted to  
authorize the search of any person or persons it would violate 
the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.8  After noting 
that the warrant did not name any particular person or persons, 
the majority continues: 
 Nor did the language in the description refer to a 
place and any or all "persons found therein" as did the 
warrants before the courts in State v. Sims, 382 A.2d 
638, 642 (N.J. 1978) and State v. DeSimone, 288 A.2d 
849, 850 (N.J. 1972).  The Fourth Amendmnet requires 
that the warrant particularly describe the place to be 
searched and the persons to be seized.  The face of the 
warrant demonstrates its failures to meet the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Id.  This argument is wrong and is not supported by either State 
v. Sims, 382 A.2d 638, 642 (N.J. 1978), or State v. DeSimone, 288 
A.2d 849, 850 (N.J. 1972). 
 Sims involved the application of legal principles 
articulated in DeSimone.  There, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that a warrant authorizing a search of all 
persons found on described premises violated the Fourth 
Amendment's particularity requirement.  Writing for the court, 
Chief Justice Weintraub observed: 
 With regard to the Fourth Amendment demand for 
specificity as to the subject to be searched, there is 
none of the vice of a general warrant if the individual 
is thus identified by physical nexus to the ongoing 
criminal event itself.  In such a setting, the officer 
executing the warrant has neither the authority nor the 
                     
     
8The Fourth Amendment, of course, provides that warrants 
shall not be issued unless "supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized" (emphasis added). 
  
opportunity to search everywhere for anyone violating a 
law.  So long as there is good reason to suspect or 
believe that anyone present at the anticipated scene 
will probably be a participant, presence becomes the 
descriptive fact satisfying the aim of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The evil of the general warrant is thereby 
negated.  To insist nonetheless that the individual be 
otherwise described when circumstances will not permit 
it, would simply deny government a needed power to deal 
with crime, without advancing the interest the 
Amendment was meant to serve. 
 
288 A.2d at 850. 
  
 Instead of presenting a "particularity" question, 
 
Chief Justice Weintraub wrote, a warrant authorizing a search of 
any person found on described premises presents a question of 
probable cause: 
 
 On principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to search 
persons identified only by their presence at a 
specified place should depend upon the facts.  A 
showing that lottery slips are sold in a department 
store or an industrial plant obviously would not 
justify a warrant to search every person on the 
premises, for there would be no probable cause to 
believe that everyone there was participating in the 
illegal operation.  On the other hand, a showing that a 
dice game is operated in a manhole or in a barn should 
suffice, for the reason that the place is so limited 
and the illegal operation so overt that it is likely 
that everyone present is a party to the offense.  Such 
a setting furnishes not only probable cause but also a 
designation of the persons to be searched which 
functionally is as precise as a dimensional portrait of 
them. 
 
Id. 
 
 This analysis is specifically approved in Professor 
LaFave's treatise: 
 Unquestionably, the DeSimone rationale is correct.  A 
search warrant authorization to search all persons 
found within a specifically described place is not 
lacking in particularity in the sense that the 
  
executing office will be unable readily to determine to 
whom the warrant applies.  Rather, the question is 
whether there is sufficient particularity in the 
probable cause sense, that is, whether the information 
supplied the magistrate supports the conclusion that it 
is probable anyone in the described place when the 
warrant is executed is involved in the criminal 
activity in such a way as to have evidence thereof on 
his person.  If the evidence tendered to the magistrate 
supports such a conclusion, then the search-all-
persons-present warrant is unobjectionable.  If the 
evidence does not support such a conclusion, then the 
searches of those present find no justification in the 
search warrant. 
 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5e at 231 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 I agree with DeSimone and with Professor LaFave's 
analysis, and I therefore think that the validity of the warrant 
at issue in this case depends on whether the search warrant 
application established probable cause to believe that all 
persons found on the premises of the apartment were involved in 
the regular drug activity that had been going on at that 
location.  The majority says nothing with respect to this 
question, but I believe that the requisite probable cause was 
shown. 
 The holdings in State v. DeSimone, supra, and State v. 
Sims, supra, both of which seem to me to be correct, serve to 
frame the question presented by the warrant involved here.  In 
DeSimone, the police had probable cause to believe that a 
particular car was regularly used to drop off "policy" slips, a 
warrant was issued to search the car and "all persons found 
therein," and the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the warrant, 
  
observing that there was probable cause to believe that any 
person found in the car "whether driver or passenger would be 
involved in the criminal operation."  288 A.2d at 854.  In Sims, 
by contrast, the police intercepted a single telephone call to a 
service station owned by "one Robert (Bob) Quinlan," and during 
this call "[t]he caller placed two illegal horse bets with a 
person identifying himself as Bob."  382 A.2d at 641.  A warrant 
was issued to search all persons found in the station, but the 
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there was no "probable 
cause to believe that all persons who might be found on the 
premises of the service station were engaged in illegal 
gambling."  Id.  
 In the case now before us, the police had evidence that 
the apartment had been the scene of frequent drug sales to a 
large number of buyers for some time.  Thus, there was probable 
cause to believe that anyone living in the apartment was involved 
in this activity.  There was also a good likelihood that visitors 
to the apartment were drug buyers.  While it was certainly 
possible that there would also be some innocent visitors to the 
apartment (such as the Bakers), I think that there was probable 
cause to search anyone found on the premises. 
 There is considerable authority supporting this 
conclusion.  In the Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 
1976), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a 
provision of a warrant authorizing a search of any person found 
in an apartment.  The affidavit submitted in support of the 
warrant stated that an informant had recently seen heroin sales 
  
within the apartment and that police officers conducting a 
surveillance of the apartment had seen known drug traffickers 
entering and leaving.  Id. at 106.  "From these asserted facts 
and fair inferences drawn therefrom," the court stated, "it was 
permissible to conclude that it was probable that any person in 
the apartment was a participant in the trafficking in heroin 
there."  Id.  
 In State in Interest of L.Q., 566 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1989), the court upheld a comparable warrant 
provision based on facts strikingly similar to those present in 
the case now before us.  The warrant was issued based on an 
affidavit stating that surveillance of the residence had revealed 
comings and goings characteristic of drug sales and that a 
controlled purchase of drugs had been made at the residence.  Id. 
at 223-24.  The court wrote: 
 The evidence was sufficient to create a well-grounded 
suspicion or belief that numerous sales of [drugs] were 
being conducted in the premises.  Although the 
affidavit did not exclude the possibility of other 
activities on the premises, the description of the 
activity actually observed provided a firm foundation 
for the suspicion or belief that any person in the 
private premises was involved in the overt unlawful 
activity of sale and possession of cocaine.  Such a 
suspicion or belief is not limited to persons already 
there when the police arrive, but reasonably extends to 
a person who enters the premises during the search. 
 
Id. at 226 (footnote omitted). 
 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has handed down 
similar decisions.  See Commonwealth v. Graciani, 554 A.2d 560, 
561-62 (Pa. Super. 1989); Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 535 A.2d 
611, 615 (Pa. Super. 1987).  So have courts in other 
  
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. State, 761 S.W.2d 809, 811 
(Tex. App. 1988); People v. Betts, 456 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (1982).  
In accordance with these authorities, I conclude that the warrant 
in this case was supported by probable cause to search any one 
found on the premises.9   
 B.  Moreover, even if the warrant did not authorize the 
search of Corey Baker and that search was illegal, Armstrong was 
still entitled to summary judgment pursuant to our court's well 
established standard for individual liability in an action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In such an action, we have held, an individual 
defendant is liable only if he or she has "personal involvement 
in the alleged wrongs."  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 
1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  "Personal involvement can be shown through 
allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and 
acquiescence."  See also Keenan v. Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 
466 (3d Cir. 1992); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 
(3d Cir. 1990).10  Id.   Here, there is no suggestion in the 
                     
     
9I do not reach -- and I do not read the majority opinion as 
reaching -- the qualified immunity defense pled in Armstrong's 
answer.  See App. at 29; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 
(1987).  The district court did not base its award of summary 
judgment on this ground, and Armstrong did not raise this issue 
on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance.  The majority 
has not addressed this issue, and accordingly, any consideration 
of this issue will have to await further proceedings. 
     
10Although the majority hints, see Maj. typescript at 14 
n.5, that it likes the law of some other circuits better than our 
own, the majority fails to show how the claims at issue here 
could survive summary judgment under the precedents it cites.  
The majority states that other circuits, rather than demanding 
"actual knowledge," have held that "reckless disregard on the 
part of a supervisor will suffice."  Id. (quoting Hall v. 
Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 1993)).  However, the 
  
summary judgment record that Armstrong personally directed the 
other officers to search Corey Baker, and there is insufficient 
evidence to show either his "actual knowledge" or "acquiescence."  
 As for actual knowledge, although the majority thinks 
that a rational trier of fact could infer, based solely on the 
small size of the apartment, that Armstrong was aware that the 
search of Corey Baker was taking place, I am doubtful about 
this.11  But in any event, even if a rational trier of fact could 
infer that Armstrong was aware that Corey Baker was being 
searched, I think that the "actual knowledge" requirement demands 
something more -- viz., knowledge that the other officers lacked 
a lawful basis for the search. 
 A simple hypothetical demonstrates the need for this 
additional showing.  Suppose a supervisory policy official 
happened to observe subordinates from some distance while they 
were carrying out a Terry frisk.  If it turned out that this 
frisk was unlawful because the frisking officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion, could the supervisory official be held 
liable under Section 1983 simply because he or she had actual 
                                                                  
majority makes no effort to demonstrate that there is sufficient 
evidence in the summary judgment record to establish that 
Armstrong was reckless in failing to recognize that the other 
officers were acting unlawfully and, as I attempt to show below, 
Dissenting typescript at 15-19, I do not think that the summary 
judgment record contains such evidence. 
     
11
 The search of Corey Baker would not necessarily have 
taken a long time, and therefore unless Armstrong happened to 
look into the bedroom where the search was allegedly taking place 
during that relatively brief period, he would not have seen the 
search.   
  
knowledge that the frisk had occurred?  I think the answer must 
clearly be "no."  If the supervisor did not know (or at least 
have cause to know)12 that reasonable suspicion was lacking, the 
supervisor should not be liable.   
 Here, there is no direct or circumstantial evidence 
that Armstrong possessed such knowledge.  All that the record 
shows is that Armstrong had seen Corey Baker, a 17 year old, a 
few steps from the door of an apartment believed to be a center 
of cocaine sales to young people, that Corey Baker was then held 
outside for perhaps ten minutes by other officers, and that 
immediately thereafter Corey Baker was taken into the apartment 
to the first bedroom and searched.  From these facts, it cannot 
reasonably be inferred that Armstrong knew (or should have known) 
that the other officers did not have a legitimate basis for 
searching Corey Baker -- such as consent or probable cause based 
on a pat down or statements made by other persons on the scene.  
Nor can it be inferred that Armstrong acquiesced in the allegedly 
illegal conduct.  Accordingly, the district court was correct in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Armstrong on the claim 
grounded on the search of Corey Baker. 
                     
     
12As previously noted, our precedents require "actual," not 
constructive knowledge.  In the discussion above, I do not 
suggest that constructive knowledge is sufficient.  Rather, I 
argue that it would be manifestly unjust to hold a supervisor 
liable when he or she lacks even constructive knowledge. 
  
 III. 
 Excessive Force.  I now turn to the claim based on the 
use of excessive force during the Bakers' detention. The majority 
holds -- and I agree -- that the detention of the Bakers during 
the execution of the warrant was itself proper.  The majority 
concludes, however, that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the 
use of handcuffs and guns during that detention and that the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain a judgment against Armstrong 
for this violation.   
 Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive 
force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop must be 
analyzed under the "reasonableness" standard of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  The 
Supreme Court has explained: 
 Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized 
that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop 
necessarily carries with it the right to use some 
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect 
it.  Because "[t]he test of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition 
or mechanical application," . . . however, its proper 
application requires careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case. . . . 
 
 The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must 
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer 
on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight. 
 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
 
 If an officer is making an arrest, it seems to me that 
the use of handcuffs will always be reasonable.  As for the use 
of handcuffs during an investigatory stop and the drawing of a 
  
gun during an arrest or an investigatory stop, the cases hold 
that reasonableness must be judged based on the particular 
circumstances of the case.   See, e.g., Foote v. Dunagan, 33 F.3d 
445, 448-49 (4th Cir. 1994) (reasonable to draw gun during 
investigatory stop; United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 666 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 608 (1993) (reasonable to 
draw gun and use handcuffs during investigatory stop); Tom v. 
Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 1992) (reasonable to kneel and 
attempt to handcuff during investigatory stop); Courson v. 
McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1493 (11th Cir. 1991) (reasonable to 
point shotgun and direct person to lie on ground during 
investigatory stop); United States v. Haye, 825 F.2d 32, 35 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (reasonable to wrestle to ground and use handcuffs 
during investigatory stop); United States v. Nargi, 732 F.2d 
1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 1984) ("`[T]here is no hard and fast rule 
concerning the display of weapons' in investigative stops."); 
United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983) (reasonable 
to draw gun and use handcuffs during investigatory stop); cf. 
Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982) (officer's pointing of gun during 
traffic altercation violated due process). 
 In this case, therefore, in order to hold Armstrong 
liable for the improper use of handcuffs and guns by the other 
officers, it must be shown (a) that Armstrong knew that the other 
officers used handcuffs and guns and (b) that Armstrong knew that 
the other officers lacked reasonable grounds for their conduct. 
  
 I believe that the summary judgment record is 
sufficient to establish the first element described above.13   
I do not think, however, that the record supports the inference 
that Armstrong knew, at any point appreciably before he ordered 
the Bakers' release, that the other officers lacked a reasonable 
basis for handcuffing the Bakers or holding them at gunpoint. 
Moreover, the record does not show that Armstrong recklessly 
failed to inquire about the basis for the other officers' 
actions.  The record does not establish how much time elapsed 
between the point when he first saw that the Bakers were 
handcuffed and held at gunpoint and the point when he ordered 
their release, but it appears that this period must have been 
less than 15 minutes, see supra note 3, and the record shows that 
Armstrong was busy during this time questioning Clementh Griffin.  
Accordingly, I do not see how Armstrong could be held to have had 
"actual knowledge" of or to have "acquiesced" in the 
constitutional violations that the other officers allegedly 
committed.   
                     
     
13Since we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, I 
agree with the majority that we must accept the Bakers' 
statements that handcuffs and guns were employed.  In addition, 
while I question (for reasons explained above in connection with 
the alleged search of Inez Baker's purse) whether it is 
reasonable to infer that Armstrong saw what was done to the 
Bakers outside the apartment, I think that the record permits the 
inference that he saw that the Bakers were handcuffed when they 
were brought into the house and that he saw that a gun was 
pointed at Inez Baker while she was in the kitchen.   
  
 IV. 
 For these reasons, I believe that the district court 
correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Armstrong.  I 
share the majority's sympathy for the Bakers' plight.  It was a 
most unfortunate coincidence that they happened to arrive at the 
scene of a drug search just as the officers were arriving to 
execute the warrant.  Their experience must have been terrifying. 
It is also most unfortunate that, prior to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, the Bakers did not ascertain the 
identities of the officers who allegedly engaged in the conduct 
that is claimed to have violated their constitutional rights.  
Sympathy for the Bakers, however, does not justify a decision 
that ignores the deficiencies in the summary judgment record.  I 
therefore dissent from the decision of the majority insofar as it 
reverses the district court's award of summary judgment.   
  
 APPENDIX 14 
 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
       vs                                    SEARCH WARRANT 
Cheryl Woods        
      Defendant 
 
 To  Detective Robert Armstrong   and/or any officer of  
Gloucester County Prosecutor's Office, any officer of the New 
Jersey State Police or any officer of any Police Department 
having jurisdiction: 
 1.  This matter being opened to the Court by Detective 
Robert Armstrong of Monroe Township, on application for the 
issuance for a search warrant for the (x) premises (x) persons 
(x) vehicle described below, and the Court having reviewed the 
(x) affidavit of ( ) testimony under oath of the said Detective 
Robert Armstrong and being satisfied therefrom that located 
therein or thereon are: 
 evidence of possession and distribution of controlled 
dangerous substances, including, but not limited to, 
controlled dangerous substances and relating 
paraphernalia, records, documents and other items 
relating to the possession and distribution of 
controlled dangerous substances. 
 
and that probable cause exists for the issuance of such warrant: 
 
 2.  YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to search the (x) premises 
described below (x) person(s) described below (x) vehicle 
                     
     
14Printed text is in regular type.  Typewritten text is 
underlined.  Handwritten text is italicized. 
  
described below and to serve a copy of this warrant on such 
person or on the person in charge or control of such premises; 
 3.  YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED, in the event you seize any 
of the above described articles, to give a receipt for the 
property so seized to the person whom it was taken or in whose 
possession it was found, or in the absence of such person to 
leave a copy of this warrant together with such receipt in or 
upon the said premises from which the property is taken. 
 4.  The following is a description of the (x) premises, 
(x) person, (x) vehicle to be searched: 
 an apartment located in an apartment building at 607 
South Main Street, Williamstown, New Jersey, a three 
(3) story wood frame residence located on the corner of 
South Main Street and Virginia Avenue, having a parking 
lot on the Virginia Avenue side and directly across the 
street from the Williamstown Fire Company. 
 
 
 5.  Special instructions (Time Limitations, etc.): 
 
  Anytime day or night - no knock 
 
         Given and issued under my hand at  10  o'clock  p  m.,  
 
this   First     day of   June     , 1991. 
  
 
 
 
 
      
